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Truck-only lanes and truck tollways have been studied and promoted in the U.S. as a potential 
tool for combating road congestion, enhancing safety and reducing pavement damage. The 
goal of this paper is to conduct a preliminary and partial economic analysis of truck lanes by 
considering whether there are advantages in separating light and heavy vehicles, and if so how 
this can be implemented using tolls or access regulations. Several factors are identified as 
important: the relative volumes of light and heavy vehicles, lane indivisibilities, values of 
travel time for light and heavy vehicles, the relative congestion costs they impose, and the 
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 1  INTRODUCTION 
Truck-only lanes and truck tollways have been extensively studied in the U.S.
1 Although no 
such facilities have yet been built
2 several U.S. states, including California, Texas and 
Virginia, have conducted studies (Federal Highway Administration 2003; Transportation 
Research Board 2003; Hedlund 2004). The Southern California Association of Governments 
(SCAG) has a plan that calls for an interconnected system of truck-only freeway lanes on four 
highways that would cost nearly $10 billion. Truck-only lanes were proposed for a North 
American Free Trade Association (NAFTA) highway between Toronto and Laredo, Texas. 
The Reason Foundation published a detailed study (Samuel et al. 2002) arguing that an 
interstate network of private truck tollways could be profitable in the U.S. And Texas has 




Several potential advantages of dedicated truck-only facilities are identified in the literature. 
 
Road design: Trucks require higher road-design standards than do light vehicles as far as 
pavement thickness, lane widths, road curvature, grades, etc.  By restricting trucks to a 
subset of roads or lanes, the rest of the road network can be built to a lower standard. 
 
Congestion: If the provision of truck-only lanes reduces traffic volumes for trucks, it reduces 
the congestion delay they incur as well as the frequency of braking, accelerating, and 
overtaking. It also improves reliability of travel time for freight deliveries (Douglas 2005). 
 
Safety: Although the empirical evidence is not clear-cut, it appears that accident rates are 
higher in mixed (i.e. heavy and light vehicle) traffic than in homogeneous traffic 
(Middleton and Lord 2005; Forkenbrock and March 2005). If so, safety is promoted by 
segregating trucks from cars. And it is generally accepted that automobile drivers dislike 
trucks and would be willing to pay to avoid them.
4 
 
Air quality: By supporting higher and less variable speeds, truck-only lanes contribute to 
better overall air quality (Douglas 2005).
5 
 
                                                 
1 Reich et al. (2002) provide an extensive literature review up to 2002. 
2 Only two facilities in the U.S. are designed to accommodate trucks while permitting passenger 
vehicles to access them. One is the New Jersey Turnpike, and the other is a segment of Interstate 5 
north of Los Angeles (Middleton and Venglar 2006). The New Jersey Turnpike is a so-called “dual -
dual” roadway, defined to be “a system of parallel, grade-separated lanes with trucks restricted from 
operating in the center, auto-only lanes.” 
3 The Trans Texas Corridor will consist of a 4,000-mile network of corridors up to 1,200 feet wide 
with three road lanes in each direction for passenger vehicles, and two road lanes in each direction for 
trucks. Road tollways will be designed for an 80 mph speed limit. In addition, the corridors will have 
one rail track in each direction for each of three types of rail service (freight, commuter rail, and high-
speed passenger rail) as well as corridors for utilities. The first Trans Texas Corridor, TTC-35, is under 
development. 
4 Using contingent valuation analysis Bambe and McMullen (1996) estimated that motorists would be 
willing to pay about $35 (1995) annually to remove triple-trailer combination trucks from Oregon's 
highways. (Information taken from Forkenbrock and March 2005, p. 8.) However, while automobile 
drivers generally perceive an improvement in safety and operations from lane restrictions on heavy 
vehicles, truck drivers do not foresee improvements (Koehne et al. 1996; Douglas 2005). 
5 However, pollutant emissions and/or noise levels may increase near truck lanes.   2
Noise: Reductions in noise are a potential benefit (Douglas 2005). 
 
Truck type: Truck-only lanes will facilitate use of so-called Long Combination Vehicles 
(LCVs) that exploit economies of vehicle size.
6 Use of larger trucks not only reduces 
transport costs per tonne-km, but also reduces congestion delays for a given amount of 
freight transported because fewer trucks are on the road. 
 
Truck-only roads or lanes are also recognized to have several potential disadvantages. 
 
Capacity indivisibilities: Building truck-only roads or lanes (or High Occupancy Vehicle 
(HOV) lanes more generally) is cost-effective only if both truck volumes and total traffic 
volumes are sufficiently high (OECD 1992; Douglas 2005; Forkenbrock and March 2005). 
Lane indivisibilities are an important practical consideration that makes it difficult to 
allocate capacity between vehicle categories in efficient proportions (Small 1983; 
Dahlgren 1998, 2002; Yang and Huang 1999; Parsons et al. 2005). And to facilitate access 
in the event of incidents, as well as to provide reliable travel times for truckers, it is 
advisable to build twin truck lanes (Fischer et al. 2003) which increases the infrastructure 
costs. Wilbur Smith Associates (2003) assessed various strategies for dealing with 
congestion on Interstate 10 (I-10), which runs across the southern U.S. from Florida to 
California. This study concluded that simply adding more general-purpose lanes to I-10 
would be more effective than adding truck-only lanes.  
 
Availability of right-of-way: Some intercity travel corridors in the U.S. lack sufficient width to 
accommodate double truck lanes throughout their length (Poole and Samuel 2004). And 
many Interstate highways lack an uninterrupted median that would permit an extra lane or 
lanes to be built in the medium (Reich et al. 2002). 
 
Temporal segregation: Truckers generally avoid traveling during peak commuting periods 
(Donaghy and Schintler 1998; Fischer et al. 2003). A majority of their trips are made 
during mid-day (10:00-15:00) and at night. To the extent that auto and trucking trips are 
segregated temporally they can use the same roads at different times, and building separate 
facilities is unnecessary. 
 
Lane access considerations: Complete segregation of heavy vehicles from cars is not 
practical.
7 Truck route or lane restrictions may add to travel distance which militates 
against truckers using them for short haul trips. And forcing vehicles to use certain lanes 
may increase the number of lane changes (e.g. if trucks are restricted to left-hand lanes) 
which contributes to traffic flow turbulence and accident hazards (Gan and Jo 2003). 
 
This list of pros and cons indicates that the optimal design and cost-effectiveness of truck 
facilities depends on many practical considerations. A large number of facility types have 
been proposed that differ according to numbers of lanes, conversions vs. additions (including 
conversion of HOV lanes, and admitting trucks to High Occupancy Toll (HOT) lanes), and 
usage restrictions. But most studies use simulation models without describing (at least in 
                                                 
6 Samuel et al. (2002) conclude that permitting the largest LCVs would increase productivity by $3.04 
per vehicle-mile. 
7 As Wilbur Smith Associates (2003, p.35) remarks: “Even in cases where truck separation is applied, 
there will have to be some degree of car/truck interaction, especially along segments where local 
traffic merges on/off the freeway system. This presents significant traffic engineering issues (trucks 
and cars crossing lanes to merge to and from exclusive lanes).”   3
publicly available documents) how the models work or identifying precisely what factors 
drive the results. 
 
To the best of our knowledge no formal analytical/economic analysis of truck-only facilities 
has been conducted to date. Nevertheless, the economics of truck-only facilities resemble in 
several respects the economics of HOV and HOT lanes which have been studied from an 
economic perspective. An early and insightful analysis of HOV lanes is found in Small (1977, 
1983). Small uses a disaggregate logit model of modal choice to determine whether HOV 
lanes for buses are cost effective, and how well they perform relative to congestion tolls. He 
finds that with ideal lane segregation of buses and cars (i.e. when capacity is perfectly 
divisible), bus priority lanes yield about half the benefits of marginal cost pricing.
8 But when 
the indivisibility of HOV lanes is accounted for, auto congestion becomes dramatically worse 
because a full lane has to be allocated to HOV traffic. Only at high volumes of passengers per 
lane-hour do the positive benefits for HOV lane users outweigh the negative effects of 
increased auto delay. Mannering and Hamed (1990) obtain similar results for HOV lanes 
designed for cars. 
 
These and other studies convey two important lessons that carry over to truck-only facilities. 
One is that the benefits from dedicated facilities depend critically on the volume of traffic that 
will use them. The second lesson is that lane- or route-access restrictions are second-best 
policies compared to efficient pricing. 
 
The current paper will focus on one aspect of the economics of truck-only facilities: how 
existing road space should be allocated between light vehicles and heavy vehicles. This 
question has been partially addressed by Berglas et al. (1984) and Arnott et al. (1992) inter 
alios, and the model used developed in Arnott et al. (1992) will be used here. Section 2 
following summarizes the model and derives some general results concerning traffic 
allocation in the unregulated equilibrium and the social optimum. Section 3 describes the 
setting for the numerical examples, and Section 4 describes the results. Finally, Section 5 
summarises the main findings of the study and identifies various ways in which it should be 
extended. 
 
2  THE MODEL 
To help illustrate the workings of the model it is developed in two steps.  
2.1  The general model 
The general model is adopted from Arnott et al. (1992). There are two routes or sets of traffic 
lanes indexed by r, r=1,2. And there are two types or groups of vehicles, indexed by g, g=L,H, 
where subscripts L and H refer to light vehicles (henceforth Lights) and heavy vehicles 
(henceforth Heavies) respectively.
 9 The number of trips taken by Lights is  L N , and the 
                                                 
8 Evans (1992) obtains a similar result using a deterministic model with travellers who differ in their 
VOT and willingness to pay to make a trip. Like Small, Mohring (1979) emphasizes the benefits of 
reserved bus lanes as a second-best instrument when road pricing is precluded.   
9 With two discrete groups it is necessary to contend with a number of possible group-to-route 
allocations (Arnott et al. 1992; Small and Yan 2001). This complication can be avoided by using a 
model with a continuum of traveller types (e.g. as in Verhoef and Small 2004). The discrete typology 
is adopted here for two reasons. First, it is suitable for a study of truck toll lanes in which there is a 
natural dichotomy of types and access regulations. Second, Heavies differ from Lights not only in size   4
number of trips by Heavies is  H N .  L N  and  H N  are fixed; i.e. independent of the cost of a trip. 
Trips on the two routes are perfect substitutes. The cost incurred by type g for a trip on route r 
is a linear
10 increasing function of the number of vehicles of each type using the same route:  
 
 







rLrLrHrHrrr CcNcNFr t =+++= 123123 ,                                          (1a) 
 







rLrLrHrHrrr CcNcNFr t =+++= 123123 .                                        (1b) 
In writing formulae (1a,1b) we use the convention that a superscript denotes the user type that 
incurs the cost in question, and a subscript denotes the group that creates the cost. Term (1) in 
each expression is the cost imposed by Lights that use the same route. Term (2) is the 
analogous cost imposed by Heavies. Following Arnott et al. (1992) the coefficients 
L
Lr c  and 
H
Hr c , r=1,2, will be called own-cost coefficients, and the coefficients 
L
Hr c  and 
H
Lr c , r=1,2, will 
be called cross-cost coefficients. Term (3) includes costs that are independent of usage 
including vehicle operating costs, free-flow travel time costs, and the internalized component 
of single-vehicle accident costs. Finally, term (4) is the toll (if any). It is assumed that tolls 
can be differentiated by vehicle type and route, which is typical practice on tolled facilities 
around the world. 
2.1.1  Unregulated equilibrium 
In the absence of tolls or lane-access restrictions, three types of equilibrium route allocations 
are possible (Arnott et al. 1992; Small and Yan 2001): integrated equilibria, partially 
separated equilibria and segregated equilibria. In an integrated equilibrium both Lights and 
Heavies use each route. In a partially separated equilibrium, one type uses both routes and the 
other type uses only one route. And in a segregated equilibrium each type uses only one route. 
 
If type g uses both routes then, by Wardrop’s first principle, the costs must be equal: 
 
12
gg CC = .                                                                (2) 
 
The necessary and sufficient conditions for an integrated equilibrium are: 
 
12
LL CC = ,                                                              (3a) 
12
HH CC = ,                                                             (3b) 
1212 0, 0, 0, 0 LLHH NNNN >>>> .                                            (4) 
 
                                                                                                                                                         
and maneuverability, but also in terms of accident frequencies, emissions, road damage costs, values 
of time and other characteristics. Constructing an empirically accurate and tractable joint frequency 
distribution of these dimensions would be a challenge, and it would preclude analytical results. 
10 Linear functions are chosen mainly for tractability. Most road traffic studies assume that travel time 
(and travel time cost) is a strictly convex function of usage. These functions are typically specified in 
terms of instantaneous flows. When specified in terms of trips the functional relationship can be 
approximately linear. In the case of Vickrey’s bottleneck queuing model with identical travelers and 
linear schedule delay cost functions, the relationship is exactly linear; see Arnott et al. (1998) and 
Small and Verhoef (2006, Chapter 4).   5
Substituting (1a) into (3a), and (1b) into (3b), yields a pair of linear reaction functions of the 
form  ( ) 11
L
LH NfN =  and  ( ) 11
H
HL NfN = . By the usual stability criterion an integrated 
equilibrium can obtain only if ( )( ) 11 1
LH
HL fNfN ¶¶¶¶< . Given eqns. (1a) and (1b) the 
stability condition works out to 
 
( )( ) ( )( ) 12121212
LLHHLLHH
LLHHHHLL cccccccc ++>++ .                                (5) 
 
Stability requires that the own-cost coefficients on the two routes be larger (in a sense defined 
by condition (5)) than the cross-cost coefficients. One might think that Condition (5) is 
guaranteed to hold if the following two inequalities are satisfied: 
 
LHLH
LrHrHrLr cccc > , r=1,2.                                                   (6) 
 
In fact, this is not the case as Appendix A illustrates with a numerical example. This 
demonstrates that stability is a property of pairs of routes rather than routes in isolation. 
However, it is trivial to show that the two conditions in (6) imply Condition (5) if the routes 
satisfy the so-called similarity property
11: 
 









===                                                  (7) 
 
The similarity property will be invoked later in this section. It will hold if the cost coefficients 
have the functional form 









where  r s  is the flow capacity of Route r and 
g
h g  is independent of r. 
 
It should be emphasized that Condition (5) is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for an 
integrated equilibrium. In addition, the nonnegativity conditions (4) must be satisfied. As 
Arnott et al. (1992, 83-84) explain, there are three cases to consider: 
 
1.  Stability condition satisfied, but nonnegativity conditions violated. In this case there is 
a unique equilibrium that is either partially separated or segregated. 
2.  Nonnegativity conditions satisfied, but stability condition violated. Two equilibria 
exist, each of which can be partially separated or segregated. 
3.  Stability and nonnegativity conditions both violated. There is a unique equilibrium that 
is either partially separated or segregated. 
 
2.1.2  The social optimum 
Following the usual practice, welfare will be measured using social surplus, W. Let  gr e  denote 
the external cost of a trip by type g on route r that is not borne by users of the route 
collectively. Parameter  gr e  includes the costs of emissions, noise, pavement damage and so 
                                                 
11 This term is introduced in Arnott et al. (1992, §2.1).   6
on; for brevity it will be called the environmental cost. Since tolls are a transfer from users to 
the toll-road authority, toll revenues net out of social surplus and W  is given by the formula 
 
( ) ( ) 1,2
LLLHHH
LrLrHrHrrLrLrLrLrHrHrrHrHr r WcNcNFeNcNcNFeN
= =+++++++ ￿ .      (8) 
 
Let –g be the index for the type other than g; i.e. if g=L then  gH -= , and vice versa. 
Differentiating W with respect to  gr N  one obtains the marginal social cost of a trip by type g 


























.                          (9) 
 
Term (1) in eqn. (9) is the private cost net of toll borne by a user of group g on route r. Term 
(2) is the external cost imposed on users of the same type on route r. Term (3) is the external 
cost imposed on users of the other type. And Term (4) is the environmental cost imposed on 
non-users. Terms (2-4) are disregarded by the user, and hence are a potential source of 
inefficiency in the unregulated regime. 
 
The social or first-best optimum achieves a maximum of W. A necessary condition for it to be 
optimal for type g to use both routes is that the marginal social costs are equal: 
 
12
gg MSCMSC = .                                                         (10) 
 
Condition (10) is the counterpart to Condition (2) for the unregulated equilibrium. Similar to 
the unregulated equilibrium, the optimum may entail integration, partial separation or 
segregation of the two user types. 
2.1.3  Comparison of social optimum and unregulated equilibrium 
For two reasons it is not straightforward to compare the optimum and unregulated 
equilibrium. First, the route allocation patterns may differ. For example, the unregulated 
equilibrium allocation may be integrated whereas the optimum is partially separated or 
segregated. As the simulations in Section 4 will demonstrate, this will tend to be the case if 
one type has much higher cost coefficients than the other type so that it is optimal to give the 
high-cost type exclusive access to one of the routes. Second, despite the simple linear 
structure of the model the formulae for the route splits are unwieldy, and it is not easy to 
compare the route splits even if the optimum and unregulated equilibrium allocation patterns 
are the same. 
 
To provide some insights into how the optimum and unregulated equilibrium regimes may 
differ, we will consider two cases. 
   7
Case 1: Optimum and unregulated equilibrium both integrated 
 
Suppose both regimes are integrated. It is straightforward to show that the route splits are 
equal (and hence the optimum and unregulated equilibrium are identical) if the following 
three conditions are satisfied: 
 
1.  Free-flow travel costs are the same on the two routes:  12 ,,
gg FF gLH == . 
2.  The environmental costs are the same on the two routes:  12 ,, gg ee gLH == . 
3.  The similarity property (7) holds. 
 
Condition 1 is familiar from the literature on two parallel routes with homogeneous travelers 
(e.g. Barro and Romer 1987; Verhoef et al. 1996) where it is shown that the shorter or lower-
cost route is used excessively in the unregulated equilibrium. Condition 1 rules this bias out. 
The reason for Condition 2 is obvious: environmental costs are disregarded by users in the 
unregulated equilibrium, but if environmental costs are the same on the two routes there is no 
bias. 
 
Case 2: Optimum and unregulated equilibrium both partially separated; Lights on both routes 
 
Assume now that Lights use both routes whereas Heavies use only Route 2. This case is likely 
if Lights outnumber Heavies and Route 2 is either designed for Heavies or identical to Route 1 
except possibly for capacity. Substituting eqn. (1a) into (3a), setting  1 0 H N = , and using the 
relationships  21 LLL NNN =- and  21 LLL NNN =-, one obtains for the unregulated equilibrium 
(denoted by superscript e): 
 






=+++- .                                (11) 
 
The optimum is derived in the same way as the unregulated equilibrium except with the 
condition  12














.               (12) 
 
Subtracting (12) from (11) one obtains 
 
( )














.                       (13) 
 
As a counterpart to the integrated regime of Case 1, it is clear that the route splits are equal in 
Case 2 if the following three conditions are satisfied: 
 
1.  Free-flow travel costs are the same for Lights on the two routes:  12
LL FF = . 
2.  The environmental costs of Lights are the same on the two routes:  12 LL ee = . 
3.  The two cross-cost coefficients on Route 2 are equal:  22
LH
HL cc = .   8
 
Conditions 1 and 2 are intuitive, and closely resemble Conditions 1 and 2 of Case 1. 
According to Condition 3 the external cost that a Light incurs from each Heavy on Route 2 
( 2
L
H c ) must match the external cost that the Light imposes on each Heavy ( 2
H
L c ). If the external 
cost borne by the Light is larger than the cost that it inflicts, then too few Lights use Route 2 in 
the unregulated equilibrium and too many use Route 1. Correspondingly, if the external cost 
borne by the Light is less than the cost it inflicts, then the unregulated equilibrium results in 
too few Lights on Route 1. 
2.2  The truck lane model with Light and Heavy Vehicles 
Having considered the route usage patterns that can occur in the general model we now break 
out the cost coefficients into components. Congestion and accidents are the two main costs 
that are external to individual users (partially in the case of accidents), but internal to users as 
a group, and affect the cost coefficients. The cost coefficients are therefore written: 
 
, ,; ,; 1,2
ggg




hr cong  and 
g
hr acc  are congestion and accident coefficients respectively. Define  
 
12 , ,; ,
ggg
hhh congcongconggLHhLH =+== g , 
and 
12 , ,; ,
ggg
hhh accaccaccgLHhLH =+== g . 
 
The stability condition (5) can then be written 
 
( )( ) ( )( )
LLHHLLHH
LLHHHHLL congacccongacccongacccongacc ++>++ gggggggg .             (14) 
 
By reasoning parallel to that in Section 2.1, one might expect Condition (14) to be satisfied if 
it holds for the congestion and accident coefficients separately; i.e. if: 
 
LHLH
LHHL congcongcongcong > gggg                                            (15a) 
and  
LHLH
LHHL accaccaccacc > gggg .                                               (15b)
 
 
But Conditions (15a) and (15b) are neither necessary nor sufficient for stability. This can be 
shown by example as in Appendix A, and the lack of necessity will be apparent in the 
numerical examples of Section 4. 
 
Consider now the relative magnitudes of the own- and cross- cost coefficients. 
 
2.2.1  Relative congestion costs 
For several reasons Heavies have a greater impact than Lights on highway speeds: they 
occupy more road space, they take longer to accelerate and decelerate, and they obscure 
visibility more. These considerations are usually accounted for by using a Passenger Car   9
Equivalent (PCE) factor. Typical PCE values are 1.5-2 for buses and single-unit trucks, and 2-
3 for combination vehicles. It is common practice to adjust the PCE factor upwards with the 
percentage grade and the fraction of road length that is hilly (Middleton and Lord 2005). And 
some studies have found that the PCE factor is an increasing function of the fraction of 
Heavies in the traffic stream (e.g. Janson and Rathi 1991; Yun et al. 2005): a consideration 
that cannot be treated with the linear functions in (1a,1b). 
 
Less well documented or understood are the relative magnitudes of the congestion effects 
between vehicle types as captured by the own- and cross-congestion coefficients in eqns. 
(1a,1b).
12 To provide some flexibility in the specification, the formulation shown in panel (a) 
of Table 1 is adopted. Parameter  cong PCE  is a generic Passenger Car Equivalent for Heavies. 
Parameter  1
L
H l ‡  is an adjustment factor to account for the possibility that Heavies impose a 
disproportionately large delay or impedance on Lights. And 
g v  is the value of time for type g. 
For simplicity it is assumed that the relative magnitudes of the coefficients are the same on the 
two routes.  
2.2.2  Relative accident costs  
Relative accident costs are treated qualitatively the same way as relative congestion costs as 
described in panel (b) of Table 1. Parameter  acc PCE  is a generic Passenger Car Equivalent for 
Heavies that describes the expected accident costs imposed by a Heavy as a multiple of the 
cost imposed by a Light. Parameter  1
L
H f ‡  is an adjustment factor to account for the “fear” 
that drivers of Lights may have of Heavies and the associated psychological distress that they 
experience from driving near them. Finally, 
H m  is the cost borne by a Heavy in an accident 
with a Light as a multiple of the cost borne by a Light in an accident with a Light. The 
empirical value of 
H m  is unclear. On the one hand a Heavy vehicle and its driver may suffer 
little damage or injury in a collision with a Light vehicle. On the other hand the value of the 
vehicle and cargo at risk is typically much greater for a Heavy, and the opportunity cost of 
time spent dealing with the accident is also likely to be higher. Admittedly this formulation is 
quite crude. But it is easily implemented, and it is amenable for analysis of the stability 
condition to which we now turn. 
 
As noted above, it is not possible to check the stability condition (7) by examining the 
congestion-cost and accident-cost coefficient conditions, (15a, 15b), independently. But an 
examination of the two conditions is still instructive. Given the relative congestion cost 










LHHLH accaccaccacc f -=- gggg ,
 
 
                                                 
12 Simulation models are typically used to model pair-wise interactions between vehicle types although 
there has been some analytical research (in varying contexts); e.g. Netter (1971), Newell (1980, Chap. 
8), Berglas et al. (1984) and Arnott et al. (1992).   10
where 
s
= means “has the same sign as”. Congestion therefore tends to be destabilizing of an 
integrated equilibrium if  1
L
H l > ; i.e. if Heavies tend to impede Lights more than by the 
standard or average PCE factor. Similarly, the accident-cost coefficients tend to be 
destabilizing if  1
L
H f > ; i.e. if drivers of Lights are distressed by the presence of Heavies. 
 
Of note is that Conditions (15a, 15b) do not depend on the Passenger Car Equivalent factors, 
cong PCE  and  acc PCE , or the values of time of the two types, 
L v  and 
H v . 
 
3  PARAMETER VALUES USED FOR NUMERICAL EXAMPLES 
The travel corridor featured in the numerical examples is designed to be representative of 
limited-access highways which serve most of the medium-to-long urban truck trips in the U.S. 
Base-case parameter values are listed in Table 2. 
3.1  Routes 
The travel corridor has three traffic lanes in each direction. Route 1 comprises two lanes with 
an aggregate capacity of 4,000 (standard) PCEs per hour, and Route 2 comprises one lane 
with a capacity of 2,000 PCEs per hour. Free-flow travel speed on each route is 65 mph, 
which is the speed limit on a majority of Interstate highways. Both routes are 32.5 miles long 
so that free-flow travel time is 30 mins. 
3.2  Travel demand 
Total trip demand ( LH NN + ) is fixed at 40,000 trips per day. The proportion of Heavies is 
varied parametrically from 0% to 100%.
13 
3.3  Volume-independent user costs 
The value of travel time (VOT) for automobile drivers has been estimated in numerous 
studies. Small and Verhoef (2006, p. 3-56) use a value of $9.14/hr for U.S. metropolitan areas 
in 2003. Some recent studies assume rather higher values. For heavy vehicles a wide range of 
values for VOT have been used – in part because VOT depends on the type of vehicle and its 
load, drivers’ wage rates, the importance of punctual delivery and numerous other factors. 
Wilbur Smith Associates (2003) assume a VOT of $25/hr for trucks while acknowledging that 
this is a very conservative value. According to Forkenbrock and March (2005, p.7): 
 
“The value of time used by FHWA is $25.24 per vehicle-hour for large trucks, 
compared to $15.71 for small cars. In other studies in the United States and Europe, 
estimated values of time for trucking range as high as $193.80, with a median value 
among the studies of $40 and a mean of $51.80. The value of reliability (that is, the 
cost of unexpected delay) is another 50 to 250 percent higher than these values of 
time.” 
 
These figures suggest that the average VOT for Heavies is several times the average VOT for 
Lights. For the base-case values it is assumed that 
L v =$12/hour and 
H v =$50/hour. 
                                                 
13 Typical percentages are 20% or lower, but it is instructive to consider the full potential range.   11
3.4  Congestion cost coefficients 
Parry (2006, Table 1) assumes a PCE for congestion of 1.9 for single-unit trucks and 2.2 for 
combination trucks. The value for  cong PCE  of 2.0 used here is an (approximate) weighted 
average for the two truck types. The Light-Light congestion cost parameters,  , 1,2
L
Lr congr = , 
are chosen so that the marginal external congestion cost of a Light is about $0.10/mile on each 
route in the base-case example. 
3.5  Accident cost coefficients 
Using data from FHWA (1997), Parry (2006, Table 1) assumes external accident costs of 
$0.02/mile for Lights and $0.015/mile for Heavies. Given the widespread concern about truck 
accidents, and the dangers that trucks impose on light vehicles, the relatively small value for 
Heavies is surprising. One possible explanation is that truck drivers are better drivers on 
average than automobile drivers, and less prone to causing accidents.
14 
3.6  External costs 
Parry (2006, Table 1) reports pollution costs per gallon. The values in Table 2 are converted 
to costs per mile by dividing by his values for vehicle fuel economy. 
 
4  RESULTS OF THE NUMERICAL EXAMPLES 
4.1  Base case 
With the base-case parameter values, the stability condition holds
15 and the unregulated 
equilibrium is integrated with two-thirds of both Lights and Heavies taking Route 1. If 
Heavies account for 20% of traffic (a representative proportion for urban portions of the 
Interstate Highway System) the private cost of a trip is $10.39 for Lights and $28.40 for 
Heavies. Perhaps surprisingly, the social optimum is also integrated. Moreover, since all three 
of the conditions identified in Section 2 (Case 1) for congruence of the optimum and 
unregulated equilibria are satisfied, the two regimes coincide and nothing can be gained from 
either tolling or lane access restrictions. Naturally, this would not be true if travel demand 
were elastic. With 20% Heavies in the vehicle mix the Pigouvian tolls are $4.62 for Lights and 
$13.98 for Heavies: likely high enough to induce diversion of some trips to alternative routes 
or modes. 
4.2  Sensitivity analysis 
There is considerable uncertainty about the “true” values for several of the parameters, and 
thus sensitivity analysis is warranted. Table 3 summarizes the results for four parameters or 
                                                 
14 Consistent with this view, Forkenbrock and March (2005, p.6) write: “According to FHWA [Federal 
Highway Administration], in 71 percent of two-vehicle fatal crashes involving a large truck and 
another vehicle, police reported ‘one or more errors or other factors’ related to the behavior of the 
passenger vehicle driver and none for the truck driver.” 
15 The stability condition is satisfied despite the fact that Conditions (15a) and (15b) for the 
congestion-cost and accident-cost coefficients hold as equalities rather than inequalities. The reason 
for this is that relative to Heavies, Lights inflict more congestion than accident costs, whereas relative 
to Lights, Heavies are more averse to congestion than to accidents. Consequently, Heavies prefer to 
travel with Lights and Lights prefer to travel with Heavies.   12
sets of parameters: (a) the value of time for heavy vehicles, (b) the congestion-cost 
parameters, (c) the accident-cost parameters, and (d) characteristics of the routes. 
 
(a) Value of time for heavy vehicles 
 
The base-case value of the VOT for Heavies is 
H v =$50/hr. If this is drastically reduced to 
just $15/hr (Variant 1 in Table 3) the stability condition is satisfied only as a weak inequality. 
The unregulated equilibrium is still integrated, but in the social optimum Lights and Heavies 
are partially separated throughout the range of traffic mix as shown in Figure 1(a). Separation 
is advantageous because Heavies create much more congestion than do Lights, but value 
travel time only slightly more. It is therefore appropriate to keep Heavies away from Lights to 
the extent possible. When the proportion of Heavies reaches 41%, all the Heavies are moved 
onto Route 1 (with the higher capacity) and the majority of Lights are shifted onto Route 2.
16 
At this point the Pigouvian tolls on Route 1 take a small downward jump, the tolls on Route 2 
take a small upward jump, and the toll differentials reverse sign as shown in Figure 1(b). The 
welfare gains from tolling (i.e. the increase in W) exhibit a double peak (Figure 1(c)) with a 
local minimum at the point where Heavies switch routes. The two peak gains occur with 
Heavy proportions of 25% and 57% at which segregation is optimal. Consequently, at these 
points a lane-access rule to segregate the two types would be as effective as tolling. However, 
segregation is beneficial only within a narrow range of traffic mix about each peak, whereas 
tolling yields appreciable benefits for most of the range. 
 
If the VOT for Heavies is raised part way back up to $25/hr. the base-case pattern reappears in 
which the social optimum and unregulated equilibrium coincide. However, if the VOT is 
raised further to 150% of the base-case value (Variant 2), behaviour similar to that of Variant 
1 appears but with much higher welfare gains. The prime motivation for separation now is to 
minimize congestion for Heavies by giving them more road space than Lights.
17 Because of 
the high VOT for Heavies, the two segregation points occur at much lower Heavy proportions 
than in Variant 1 (14% and 39% vs. 25% and 57%). 
 
(b) Congestion-cost parameters 
 
For Variant 3 the PCE of Heavies is reduced from 2 to 1.5. The effect is qualitatively and 
quantitatively similar to raising 
H v  in Variant 2. By contrast, if the PCE of Heavies is raised 
from 2 to 3 (Variant 4) the unregulated equilibrium remains optimal as in the base case. 
 
In Variant 5, parameter 
L
H l  is doubled from 1 to 2 to reflect greater interference of Lights 
from Heavies. This upsets the stability condition, and the unregulated equilibrium
18 becomes 
partially separated or segregated as the Lights try to avoid the Heavies. Simultaneously 
doubling 
L
H l  and halving 
H v  (Variant 6) has a much more pronounced effect. Significant 
                                                 
16 No restriction is imposed that some Heavies always use Route 2 (e.g. the right-hand lane of a three-
lane highway). 
17 This is an instance of the principle noted in Section 2 that, if one type has much higher cost 
coefficients than the other type, it is optimal to give the first type preferential access. 
18 As explained in Section 2, if the stability condition is violated and the nonnegativity conditions are 
satisfied (as they are for certain values of the traffic mix), there are two unregulated equilibria. The 
equilibrium with the lower total social costs is assumed to prevail here and in other cases where the 
stability condition fails. Naturally, this biases downwards the potential inefficiency of the unregulated 
equilibrium and the potential benefits from tolling.   13
differences between the unregulated equilibrium and optimal route allocations are apparent 
(Figure 2(a)) and the toll differentials on the two routes exhibit a relatively complicated 
pattern as the traffic mix changes (Figure 2(b)). The welfare gains are substantial (Figure 
2(c)), and segregation is welfare-improving for an appreciable range of traffic mixes (Figure 
2(c)). It is interesting to note that either halving 
H v  alone, or doubling 
L
H l  alone, creates little 
or no scope for welfare-enhancing intervention, whereas adjusting the two parameters 
together does have an appreciable effect. Even in the simple model, parameter values can 
interact in rather complex ways. 
 
(c) Accident-cost parameters 
 
Raising the accident externality of Heavies (parameter  acc PCE ) as in Variants 7 and 8 does 
not upset the stability condition. But the optimum becomes separated and the pattern of tolls 
and welfare gains is broadly similar to that of reducing the value of time for Heavies. Halving 
the costs of accidents for Heavies (Variant 9) does not affect the results of interest, but 
doubling the costs (Variant 10) creates a pattern similar to raising the VOT of Heavies 
(Variant 2). 
 
In Variant 11, parameter 
L
H f  is doubled from 1 to 2 to reflect a fear of accidents with Heavies. 
The effect of this change is nearly identical to doubling the costs of accidents for Heavies 
(Variant 10). Surprisingly, doubling 
L
H f  again from 2 to 4 dampens the welfare gains. The 
reason for this is that the stability condition is violated, and Lights tend to separate themselves 
from Heavies in the unregulated equilibrium – thereby leaving less scope for welfare-
enhancing intervention. This is another illustration of non-monotonic behaviour in the model. 
 
(d) Route characteristics 
 
For Variants 13 and 14 the two routes are assumed to differ in length, and consequently in 
free-flow travel times.
19 As discussed in Section 2, the shorter route is used to excessive in the 
unregulated equilibrium, and tolling has a role to play in correcting the bias.
20 As Table 2 
indicates, segregation is also beneficial for a limited range of traffic mix.  
 
Finally, for Variant 15 the two routes are assumed to have equal capacities of 3,000 
vehicles/hour, and the VOT for Heavies is raised to $75/hr as in Variant 2.
21 Despite the fact 
that the total capacity of the two routes is the same, the maximum welfare gains from tolling 
in Variant 15 are about 20% smaller than in Variant 2. The reason is that it is efficient to 
devote the lion’s share of road space to the group with the higher travel costs – an option that 
is not available if the two routes are the same size. This illustrates a lesson, developed at 
greater length in Arnott et al. (1992), that the benefits from road pricing depend not only on 
the flexibility of the tolling scheme, but also on the scope for allocating road space between 
vehicle types in efficient proportions. 
                                                 
19 Differences in travel time can also arise because of differences in speed limits. However, since 
vehicle operating costs and externality costs are assumed to be proportional to distance these costs 
change if the lengths of the routes are changed. Differences in speed limits are therefore not equivalent 
to commensurate differences in route length. 
20 However, the gains are diluted by the fact that the environmental costs of travel are less on the 
shorter route. 
21 If only the capacities are changed, the social optimum remains identical to the unregulated 
equilibrium.   14
5  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Truck-only lanes and truck tollways have been promoted in the U.S. as a potential tool for 
combating road congestion, enhancing safety and reducing pavement damage. This paper has 
conducted a preliminary and partial economic analysis of truck lanes by focusing on how cars 
and trucks (or, more generally, light and heavy vehicles) choose between alternative traffic 
lanes or routes, and on whether the allocation can be improved by tolling or access 
regulations. Several factors were identified as important: the relative volumes of light and 
heavy vehicles, lane indivisibilities, relative values of travel time for Lights and Heavies and 
the relative congestion costs they impose, and the potential safety advantages (whether real or 
imagined) of separating Lights and Heavies. 
 
One perhaps unexpected conclusion is that there is no presumption that Lights and Heavies 
should be separated or segregated. Indeed, with the base-case parameter values the two types 
are integrated in both the unregulated equilibrium and the optimum, and neither tolling nor 
lane-access regulations can improve the outcome. Nevertheless, for many plausible alternative 
parameter values separation or segregation is desirable, and it can be achieved using tolls that 
are differentiated by route and vehicle type. Another finding is that the welfare gains from 
tolling vary non-monotonically with some key parameters – including the proportion of heavy 
vehicles in the traffic mix, the value of time for heavy vehicles, and the fear that light vehicle 
drivers may have of accidents with heavy vehicles. 
 
This paper provides just a first, halting, step in the analysis of heavy vehicle facilities. A 
number of extensions can be identified that deserve high priority.  
 
1.  Elastic demand: The number of Lights and Heavies using the corridor was treated as 
given. With price elastic demand the number of vehicles and the vehicle mix would 
become endogenous. In addition to route or lane choices, tolls and access regulations 
would affect trip generation and mode choice decisions that would have to be accounted 
for. 
2.  Heterogeneity: The model features just two categories of identical vehicles. In reality of 
course both light vehicles and heavy vehicles differ in numerous characteristics such as 
size, safety, operating costs, emissions and so on, that are relevant to whether they choose 
to be, or should be, integrated or segregated on the road network. 
3.  Trip-timing preferences. As noted in the Introduction, light and heavy vehicles tend to 
make trips at different times of day. Arnott et al. (1992) provide a simple theoretical 
analysis of when temporal segregation is a cost-effective alternative to spatial segregation 
with heterogeneous users. To examine this question empirically in the case of truck 
facilities it would be necessary to obtain data on light- and heavy-vehicle flows by time of 
day and, preferably, their actual trip-timing preferences. 
4.  Vehicle characteristics: Vehicle characteristics are exogenous in the model. This is a 
reasonable assumption for analysis of a single travel corridor since trucking firms would 
have little incentive to modify their vehicle fleets. The assumption sits less well for study 
of a regional or national road network – particularly since substantial productivity gains 
may be possible from using large combination vehicles (Samuel et al. 2002). 
5.  Road design: Finally, and perhaps most important, it is desirable to extend the analysis to 
account for road construction and maintenance costs and the merits of building dedicated 
truck-only lanes. According to Forkenbrock and March (2005) the cost of truck-only lanes 
varies considerably with respect to several factors: right-of-way availability, topography, 
any need to reconstruct overpasses to accommodate heavy vehicles, numbers of entrance   15
and exit ramps needed, etc. Consequently, construction cost per lane-km. can be expected 
to vary widely and will have to be assessed on a case-by-case basis. 
 
6  APPENDIX 
The pair of inequalities 
LHLH
LrHrHrLr cccc > , r=1,2, is neither necessary nor sufficient to satisfy the 
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The two routes feature the same own-cost coefficients but dissimilar cross-cost coefficients. 
By inspection it is clear that  1111
LHLH
LHHL cccc >  and  2222
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Table 1: Relative magnitudes of congestion cost and accident cost coefficients 
Source: Authors’ construction   19
 
Routes 
Characteristic  Route 1  Route 2 
Capacity  2,000 PCE /hour  4,000 PCE /hour 
Speed limit  65 mph  65 mph 
Length  32.5 miles  32.5 miles 
Demand 
LH NN +   40,000 trips per day 
Proportion of Heavies  Range 0-100% 
Volume-independent user costs 
Component  Symbol in model  Light vehicles  Heavy vehicles 




2   
Variable component 
of vehicle capital cost
 
  $0.063/mile
2   
Sum    $0.194/mile
2  $0.42/mile
3 
Values of time  g v   $12/hour
4  $50/hour
4 
Congestion cost coefficients 
Component  Symbol in model  Light vehicles  Heavy vehicles 
Light-Light coeff.  L




    2
1 
Relative impedance of 




4   
Accident cost coefficients 
Component  Symbol in model  Light vehicles  Heavy vehicles 
Light-Light coeff.  L
Lr acc   $0.02/mile
1   
PCE, Heavies 
acc PCE  
  0.75
1 
Relative cost of 
accident for Heavies 
H m     1
4 
Fear factor  L
H f   1
4   
External costs 
Noise    $0.001/mile
1  $0.027/mile
1 
Road damage    $0.000/mile
1  $0.074/mile
1 
Local pollution    $0.0133/mile
1  $0.0857/mile
1 








Table 2: Base-case parameter values 
Sources: 
1 Parry (2006, Table 1), 
2 Small & Verhoef (2006, Table 3.3), 
3 Poole & Samuel (2004, Table 4-3), 






condition Min Max Min Max
Base case Satisfied $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0
1 vH = $15/hr. Knife edge -$0.81 $0.92 -$1.32 $1.50 $931 [0.23,0.27] [0.55,0.60]
2 vH = $75/hr. Satisfied -$2.54 $1.86 -$6.01 $4.40 $7,128 [0.11,0.18] [0.33, 0.48]
(b) Congestion-cost parameters
3 PCEcong=1.5 Satisfied -$2.53 $1.98 -$4.18 $3.28 $7,275 [0.14,0.24] [0.39,0.56]
4 PCEcong=3 Satisfied $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0
5 ?L
H=2 Violated -$2.81 $2.27 -$4.19 $5.98 $66 0.13 0.38
6 ?L
H=2, vH = $25/hr. Violated -$1.60 $1.60 -$8.46 $11.37 $6,982 [0.22,0.32] [0.52,0.65]
(c) Accident-cost parameters
7 PCEacc=1 Satisfied -$1.47 $1.10 -$3.60 $2.68 $802 [0.15,0.17] [0.42,0.46]
8 PCEacc=1.5 Satisfied -$1.48 $1.12 -$3.29 $2.48 $2,747 [0.14,0.19] [0.39,0.48]
9 µH = 0.5 Satisfied $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0
10 µH = 2 Satisfied -$1.94 $1.46 -$4.12 $3.11 $4,782 [0.13,0.19] [0.37,0.49]
11 f L
H=2 Satisfied -$1.65 $1.24 -$3.29 $2.48 $4,634 [0.14,0.20] [0.38,0.50]
12 f L
H=4 Violated -$2.00 $1.54 -$2.39 $1.85 $3,002 [0.14,0.20] [0.38,0.50]
(d) Route characteristics
13 Rte 2 length 30 km Satisfied $0.00 $1.43 -$0.08 $3.01 $2,233
14 Rte 2 length 35 km Satisfied -$1.77 $0.00 -$3.88 $0.08 $2,480 [0.14,0.16] [0.41,0.50]
15 Rte capacs 3,000/hr., vH = $75/hr. Satisfied -$2.16 $2.13 -$5.11 $5.04 $5,569
None
None
Fraction of Heavies for
which segregation beneficial
Toll differential: t 2 - t 1
[0.15,0.21]
Light Heavy
(Computed in steps of 0.01)
None






Table 3: Sensitivity analysis 
Source: Authors’ construction   21
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Figure 1: Results for Variant 2:  $15/
H vhr =    22
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Figure 2: Results for Variant 6:  2
L
H l = ,  $25/
H vhr =  
 
 